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REMARKS ON COUNTERSTRIKE* 
Eric Schmitt** 
I am going to start by speaking for a few minutes about why 
Thom Shanker and I wrote Counterstrike1, the book we have been 
working on for a little over three years. I had returned to The New 
York Times after a fellowship at Stanford University. Thom and I had 
been colleagues covering the Pentagon for many years and we were 
reunited in our new beats—mine covering terrorism and Thom 
covering the Pentagon. One of the first stories we worked on 
together, in March 2008, was a piece that looked at changes in the 
way the U.S. government was combating terrorism generally, and 
combating Al Qaeda specifically. As we went around to do our initial 
interviews with officials at the White House, the State Department 
and the Pentagon, each person said essentially the same thing: to 
understand where the country is today, to understand how far we 
have come in this fight and how far we still have to go, you have to 
think back to where we were on September 11, 2001. 
Within that framework, we went back and talked to our 
sources and as we explored that theme, two arches to the narrative 
came forward. The first was how little the U.S. government knew 
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about Al Qaeda, and about terrorist organizations in general, on 
September 11, 2001. Most government officials viewed terrorism as 
something that happened overseas. To be sure, there were specialty 
niches, people in the CIA, people in the Pentagon, people in the 
F.B.I. who had studied this and had even studied Al Qaeda. And of 
course, earlier terrorist attacks included the bombing of the Marine 
Corps barracks in Beirut in 1983, the Oklahoma City bombing in 
1995, and the bombing of the U.S.S. Cole destroyer that was in Aden 
harbor in Yemen in 2000. Yet, it was not a priority for the U.S. 
government. Nor was it a priority for the new administration of 
President George W. Bush. 
There were other things on President Bush’s plate. In 
particular, China and missile defense dominated the early days of his 
first term. So much so, that officials who were in the White House on 
9/11 told us that by that afternoon, as it became clear that Al Qaeda 
was the organization most likely responsible, senior level people in 
the White House were asking each other “Al who is responsible for 
that attack?” That was the level of understanding—or lack of 
understanding—at the time of the attacks. What we try to do in the 
book is follow the evolution over the ten-year period following the 
attacks, and track how the understanding of Al Qaeda and of terrorist 
organizations becomes much more nuanced. 
The other arch that we explore is the response to 9/11 itself, 
and understandably the response was an emotional one. It was one of 
using the military might the U.S. had combined with the intelligence 
community. It involved putting, initially, a small number of U.S. 
forces on the ground in Afghanistan to fight with the Northern 
Alliance against the Taliban government that was hosting Al Qaeda. 
It involved killing and capturing as many of the Al Qaeda fighters 
and commanders as possible, and driving them out of Afghanistan. 
The problem with this approach was that it focused only on 
the idea that the enemy will collapse if you kill or capture as many of 
these fighters and commanders as you can. Essentially, the idea was 
to kill and capture your way to victory. It did not work. It did not 
work at all. This became increasingly noticeable as the fight pivoted 
from Afghanistan and the tribal areas of Pakistan to Iraq. 
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But it is not until October 2003, when then Defense Secretary 
Donald Rumsfeld pens a very important memo to about half a dozen 
of his civilian and military aides, that the strategy’s failings become 
more widely acknowledged.2 (Now at this point we have to remind 
our editors in New York that just because Don Rumsfeld said it does 
not make it automatically wrong). What Rumsfeld did in this memo is 
something important. Remember this is October of 2003—the 
insurgency in Iraq is really taking hold, guerrillas are fighting there 
and U.S. commanders on the ground are sending reports to 
Washington complaining about what is happening. So what Rumsfeld 
asks in this memo is this fundamental question: Is our strategy 
creating more militants than we’re taking off the battlefield? And if 
the answer is yes, then the U.S. needs to change its strategy and 
operations to be able to confront an enemy that has proven much 
more resilient and much more adaptive than we ever gave it credit 
for. 
So that is the second arch we follow in the book: how the 
U.S. government goes from what was a knee-jerk kill/capture 
mentality focused on a handful of fighters to a much more holistic 
approach to fighting terrorism. What do I mean by that? What I 
mean is that the new mentality adopts a whole of government 
approach. To be sure, the military, the C.I.A. and the rest of the 
intelligence community continue to play leading roles in combating 
terrorism (there is no better example of this than the May 2011 raid 
in Abbottabad, Pakistan that killed Osama bin Laden), but in the 
intervening years we have seen the growing involvement of other 
agencies. The State Department and its diplomats now are paying 
much more attention in their postings to the root causes of terrorism, 
and are trying to work with local governments and local organizations 
to address it. The F.B.I., which has been transformed into the 
country’s primary domestic counterterrorism agency, sends scores of 
agents overseas to work with their foreign law enforcement partners. 
The Treasury Department now is the lead American agency in 
tracking and stamping out the financing of terrorist networks (such as 
the Taliban and Al Qaeda). This approach did not exist prior to 9/11. 
The internal cooperation among these different governmental 
                                                 
2 See also SCHMITT & SHANKER at 44 (describing leaked memorandum). 
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organizations has improved greatly, although it is not perfect by any 
means. Finally, the cooperation with international allies of all sorts 
also has grown. To fight Al Qaeda is to fight a transnational foe that 
does not recognize international boundaries and so you have to be 
able to work with allied partners in order to combat it fully. 
So that’s the broad outline of the story. 
As the U.S. government developed a more nuanced 
understanding of Al Qaeda generally, and of Al Qaeda as a terrorist 
organization, it became clear that it was a network made up of 
different pieces. You can think of Al Qaeda as Al Qaeda, Inc. It’s a 
company, if you will. It has its own HR department. It’s a department 
that goes out and recruits fighters, and figures out who is going to be 
the best suicide bomber. It’s got a real estate department that figures 
out where to locate safe houses and where to hide all these people as 
they funnel in or around places in Iraq or Afghanistan. It’s got a 
financing department that figures out how to finance the operations 
of Al Qaeda networks, and how to buy the explosives and move 
things around. Some of these networks are more susceptible to attack 
than others; this was one of the important lessons the U.S. 
government learned over the last ten years. 
Returning to Secretary Rumsfeld’s question, we start to see a 
new kind of thinking in the Pentagon. One thing we talk about in the 
book is an interesting change in thinking on how to attack terrorist 
networks outside of the use of direct military action. Our story moves 
forward into the summer of 2005 where there is some interesting 
thinking going on inside the bowels of the Pentagon about how you 
go after terrorists. The book focuses on two characters in the 
Pentagon. The first is a Hollywood handsome young man named 
Matthew Kroenig, a graduate student from U.C. Berkeley who is 
spending the summer as an intern at the C.I.A., and is detailed for the 
second half of his summer to the Pentagon’s policy shop, which 
happens to be working in a number of areas involving deterrence. 
Kroenig is teamed up with a veteran of the Cold War by the name of 
Barry Pavel. Pavel has been there for years working on classical war 
deterrence. The two of them, and other colleagues, start exploring a 
really interesting theme, or question really, that turns into a theme: 
are there elements of classic Cold War deterrence, the strategy that 
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kept a tense peace for decades between the Soviet Union and the 
U.S., that can be updated and adapted to fighting terrorists? And 
specifically, to fighting Al Qaeda? 
Well, as they start doing their work and they start shopping 
their ideas around the Pentagon, they meet all sorts of criticism and 
resistance. People scoff at the idea. If you think about Cold War 
deterrence, it was based on the idea of the U.S. being able to hold at 
risk things that the Soviet Union held dear: physical things, 
government buildings, military bases, places with addresses that 
missiles could strike in the time of war. And obviously the Soviets 
had similar a list of potential targets in the U.S. So, the critics 
questioned how any of the elements of deterrence could be used 
against Al Qaeda when Al Qaeda is a transnational organization, and 
when Al Qaeda does not value or own physical things that can be 
targeted. It does not have an address somewhere in downtown Kabul 
that can be attacked. 
This is where the interesting research comes in. As Pavel and 
Kroenig studied the interviews being done with prisoners, it turned 
out that Al Qaeda terrorists did value things. They were not physical 
things but virtual values; things like honor and prestige and their 
status within the ummah, the Muslim public, and their prospects for 
success. So this starts percolating. How should the U.S. government 
think about using elements of Cold War deterrence to target the 
terrorist networks themselves? 
So Rumsfeld gets very excited about this. This gets him all 
energized because this is outside the box thinking, and he has timed it 
perfectly. In the late summer of 2005, he takes a trip down to the 
ranch in Crawford, Texas. He meets with President Bush and they go 
over all sorts of major national security issues. In Rumsfeld’s battered 
leather briefcase is the Power Point briefing from Kroenig and 
company on how the U.S. might go about using Cold War deterrence 
theory to combat Al Qaeda. The problem is George W. Bush is the 
war on terrorism president. He is not some kind of namby-pamby 
deterrence president. So he is very skeptical of this approach, and as 
Rumsfeld lays this out at the ranch, he can tell W ain’t buying it. The 
president is skeptical. 
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But there is somebody else in the room that day that plays an 
interesting, perhaps a pivotal role in this, and it is Marine Corps 
General James Cartwright, who at the time was the head of U.S. 
Strategic Command (the command that controls the entire nuclear 
arsenal for the U.S.). Cartwright goes on to become vice chairman of 
the Joint Chiefs of Staff. As Rumsfeld finishes his presentation, Bush 
turns to Cartwright using his call sign and marine rank and asks 
something like, “Hoss, do you believe any of this stuff that Rummy is 
pitching to me, this deterrence stuff?  Is there anything to it?” And 
Cartwright responds by saying something like, “I’m not here to talk 
about the project they’re working on but I am here to talk about 
something that you care very deeply about, missile defense. And if 
you think about it, many of the things that we’re trying to do in the 
missile defense program—a limited system of interceptors, missiles 
based on the west coast of the U.S. and Alaska that can shoot down a 
limited number of missiles from a rogue state like North Korea—are 
a form of deterrence—the idea that you can shoot down a limited 
number may give the enemy pause to try to do it. So we are working 
from similar pages here, the same book: how to use deterrence 
against an adversary, only I’m looking against the nation state and 
Rumsfeld is talking to you about something different, about a 
transnational threat.”3 
At that moment something very important happens because 
now things are starting to crystallize at the policy levels of 
government in 2005. The idea is gaining credibility, and starts to find 
its way into policy documents, and from there commanders on the 
ground can start taking heed of it. 
Well, that brings us to the next question. Obviously it is great 
to have all this written down in fancy policy papers, and even to have 
Bush basically approve it as part of a larger document. But, what 
impact is it going to have on the ground? Because what the 
commanders are facing on the ground in 2005 and 2006 are 
insurgents, in places like Iraq and even Afghanistan. So, we talk in 
our book about a number of examples where this policy starts to 
                                                 
3 See generally SCHMITT & SHANKER at 55 (describing Cartwright’s conver-
sation with President Bush).  
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filter down and starts to be carried out on the ground. Let me tell you 
about three of them. 
The first has to do with the Taliban. In Nangarhar province, a 
part of eastern Afghanistan, the Taliban is running a very effective 
campaign attacking coalition forces and it is largely doing it because it 
has a very efficient financial network. It allows them to buy the 
supplies they need, and the explosives they need. It allows them to 
pay off the insurgents and their families. It is a very smooth running 
operation. It is done through an ancient system of money exchange 
called hawalas, which have been around for centuries.4 Basically, it is a 
system of moving money around without any kind of electronic 
system tracing it, or anything else that western law enforcement can 
use. A cousin leaves money with a family-run business in Kabul, and 
the money makes it way to Kandahar without ever entering the 
banking system. It makes it very difficult for U.S. or western law 
enforcement to follow. One of the most pressing challenges facing 
U.S. forces in 2005 was how to get at this type of financing system. 
So what the U.S. commanders in Afghanistan, working with 
their Afghan allies, decide is this: they go into Nangarhar province 
where there are some 300 of these family-run businesses, and they 
shut down six. They then turn to the rest, and in their best Sopranos 
imitation, say something like, “Nice house you’ve got there, nice 
garden that goes with that house, nice lifestyle you have there for 
your children and your grandchildren. It would be a real shame if all 
of that went away because we know you have a legitimate business 
that you conduct, but we also know that you do business with the 
Taliban. If you continue to do business with the Taliban, we will shut 
you down just like we’ve shut down your neighbors and you will be 
out of business completely. 
Well, think back to that network. The commanders found a 
weak link in the network, because the hawalas decided they would 
rather protect their pocketbook than the ideology of the Taliban. 
                                                 
4 See id. at 183-84 (explaining the system of hawalas, the money transfer 
houses that operate throughout the Muslim world and are based on honor, trust 
and confidentiality). 
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Suddenly the Taliban could not get any credit. The leaders could not 
move their money through this system because the hawalas would not 
do business with them. Operations were disjointed, and shut down in 
some cases in Nangarhar province—all because the financing system 
was shut down. (Note to self: if you are an intelligence analyst, there 
are ways other than bombs and bullets to take down a terrorist 
network). 
The second example of the deterrence strategy on the ground 
is in Iraq. This is a little bit later in 2006 and 2007, when the sectarian 
violence is taking off and a major component of this shift is the 
increase in the number of suicide bombers coming in from outside 
the country. Young men are being recruited from all over the Middle 
East and North Africa. They are being funneled in through Syria in 
what the military calls “the rat line.”5 They come down through 
western Iraq and into Anbar Province where they are strapped into 
suicide vests and they carry out their bombings throughout the 
capital city, effectively undermining the legitimacy and credibility of 
the Iraqi government. The initial American approach was to pick off 
each and every one of these young men as they come in, and to stop 
them before they were able to carry out this violence. This proved 
too hard. It proved too hard because there was an insatiable supply 
of young men willing to commit the ultimate sacrifice for the cause. 
The flow continued. 
So in late 2007, the U.S. commanders on the ground started 
looking at the problem in a different way, through the deterrence 
lens. It turned out the suicide bomber network had a very important 
link: before any of these young men would carry out the bombings, 
they required that a sharia emir, or holy man, give them a blessing to 
guide them to the next world. This was very important to the recruits 
because it guaranteed they would get the benefits of blowing 
themselves up: the virgins in heaven, the payments for their family, 
                                                 
5 See generally id. at 77 (explaining that Sinjar was the “hub for key Al 
Qaeda smuggling route, or ‘ratline’, that brought fighters–especially suicide bomb-
ers–into Iraq.”). See also Dina Temple-Raston, Officials Look for Signs of Al-Qaida 
Surge in Syria, NPR.ORG (Mar. 1., 2012), http://www.npr.org/2012/ 
03/01/147683908/officials-look-for-signs-of-al-qaida-surge-in-syria (discussing the 
Syrian rat line).  
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and all other benefits that go with being a suicide bomber. So the 
Americans, working with Iraqi allies, began killing and capturing the 
emirs. Suddenly, without the involvement of the religious leader, the 
bombers balked. They would not go forward with the kind of attacks 
that Al Qaeda wanted them to do. It slowed down the attacks. It 
deterred some of them. Some of the recruits left and went home. 
They had second thoughts about it, and they were not as committed 
as they initially thought. 
The third example of deterrence theory as applied on the 
ground goes back to Afghanistan. In southern Afghanistan, there is a 
particular cell that is carrying out all sorts of attacks against the U.S. 
and Coalition forces. The attacks include small arms attacks, IEDs, 
and roadside bombings. Casualties are piling up on the allied side.  
The Americans are particularly interested in taking out the leader of 
this cell, a guy we call Ahmad. The problem is Ahmad is very smart. 
He does not appear in public very much. He does not use his cell 
phone. He uses couriers and messengers to get his orders out. In 
sum, he is very hard to detect. So the Americans do something they 
figure has worked in other places: they put a bounty on his head, 
figuring that would be incentive enough for people to turn him in. It 
does not work. It does not work because the villagers are scared to 
death of what happens if it is discovered that they ratted him out. 
And others secretly sympathize with what Ahmad is doing. They 
don’t like the Americans in their country, and they quietly cheer for 
Ahmad. An increase in the bounty offered does no good. The attacks 
keep rising. 
The deterrence theory is trickling down through the military 
and the U.S. commanders are talking about how to counter terrorist 
networks using deterrent capabilities. They are focusing on the idea 
of virtual values. What virtual values does Ahmad have? What can be 
exploited? Instead of raising the bounty on Ahmad’s head, they lower 
the bounty and then start spreading the word, using their surrogates 
in the marketplaces, that Ahmad is not the terrorist leader he used to 
be. After all when was the last time you saw him? They say that his 
fighters are defecting to other networks because Ahmad is not in 
control anymore. Ahmad has lost a little off his fast ball, if you know 
what I mean. Word is spreading throughout the community that 
Ahmad has lost his edge. 
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Well, you can imagine who is sitting in his hole somewhere 
hearing all of this. Ahmad. He is none too pleased. He is pissed off 
that the Americans are spreading this vicious propaganda against him. 
After all, his attacks are actually on the rise. His attacks are working. 
What is going on here? He is outraged. He is so outraged that he gets 
on his cell phone and starts calling his lieutenants to make sure 
nobody is defecting, to make sure nobody is believing this stuff. Well, 
this is exactly what the Americans hoped he would do because it 
plays right in to one of America’s strengths. It was one of the 
government’s strengths before the 9/11 attacks, and has continued to 
be a strength throughout the counterterrorism campaign since 9/11: 
the increasing capability of American technology to suck up all kinds 
of electronic communications, including cell phone conversations, 
emails, and anything that is sold with electronics. And this is exactly 
what the Americans did. They were able to track and locate not only 
Ahmad but the half dozen other lieutenants that he called. This is yet 
another example of how the U.S. does not need to kill with bullets 
and bombs to wrap these guys up. 
This gets us to a discussion of what is one of the frontiers of 
counterterrorism: the world of cyberspace. After all, cyberspace is 
oftentimes where terrorists do much of their recruiting—and much 
of their recruiting for money and financing. And in many ways, it is 
where they do a lot of operational recruiting and planning. In many 
cases, these young guys go to these online war games sites, and they 
use the same vernacular as teenage gamers in the U.S. or anywhere 
else in the world use—except that they have attached special code 
words to that vernacular that mean something only to some players. 
The games allow the networks to plot attacks using these simulator 
games in a way that is very hard for the National Security Agency and 
other intelligence agencies to detect. 
The Americans are making breakthroughs in this; in the past 
few years, American analysts began to hack into the cell phones of 
terrorist leaders. Once in, they use the phones to disseminate false 
and confusing messages to their fighters. Arabic speaking analysts are 
able to go into Jihad chat rooms and often do nothing more than ask 
provocative questions. They may ask, “why is it, dear brother, that we 
are supporting these attacks that we’ve seen against wedding parties 
in Jordan that are killing dozens if not scores of men, women and 
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children, Muslim civilians?” (who happen to be most of the victims in 
Al Qaeda’s attacks). Or they may ask, “how is it that this small fringe 
group has hijacked this great religion?” The whole purpose of this 
approach is to instill doubt and confusion among people who are 
fence sitters (particularly young women who are trying this out for 
size), and dissuade them from going into the organization or maybe 
get them out of the organization or movement all together. Finally, 
you have instances where intelligence analysts have been able to forge 
the online watermarks of Al Qaeda. You can imagine the mayhem 
U.S. officials have been able to cause by sending out false and 
contradictory messages under the Al Qaeda signature. 
So, far what I’ve talked about are the successes of this 
counterterrorism campaign. To be sure, even the areas of success 
have a long way to go as we continue to refine the way we look at the 
threat as it morphs over time. 
One of the areas where it has been a real challenge for the 
U.S. and its allies, however, is getting at the root causes of terrorism, 
and developing a counter messaging campaign that gets at the 
reasons terrorists become terrorists in the first place. Part of the 
problem here is that Al Qaeda, despite its diminished capability in 
places like the Pakistani frontier, still has a very strong message. It is a 
message with resilience and it is simple. It basically says the U.S. and 
the West are at war with Islam. It’s a false notion. It’s totally bogus. 
But it has traction on the Muslim street because all the Al Qaeda guys 
have to do is point to the tens of thousands of troops the U.S. had in 
Iraq until just last December, the tens of thousands of troops the 
U.S. and its allies have in Afghanistan and will continue to have at 
least through 2014, and the continued support the U.S. has for Israel 
in Middle East geopolitics. This is the gist, the thing that takes hold 
on the Muslim street. 
The U.S. government’s message, even when developed by 
people like Margaret Tutwiler and Karen Hughes with backgrounds 
in Madison Avenue advertising and political campaigns, fell on deaf 
ears. And that is because the American government has no credibility 
on the Muslim street. 
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The U.S. is now trying—and it is very difficult to do—to 
amplify the voices of credible Muslim allies and other religious 
figures who are brave enough to stand up to the insurgents, who are 
brave enough to stand up against the death threats that Al Qaeda 
issues against these people and denounce them. By using the same 
religious authority that undergirds the Al Qaeda narrative, the U.S. 
hopes to strike these guys down. It is very difficult and it is a long-
running battle and it is only now that we are starting to see the effects 
of this on the ground. The realization that the bombings Al Qaeda 
has carried out are killing mostly civilians is starting to take hold in 
people’s minds. 
What I want to do now is read a little bit from a section of 
our book because it speaks to this point of how the Americans are in 
some cases able to capitalize on opportunities that come their way 
when a credible Muslim voice presents itself as someone who can be 
used—not by the Americans in an overt way—but by Afghans or 
Iraqis or Pakistanis as their voice against this kind of extremism. In 
order to set this up a bit, I should explain that this passage is about a 
campaign that was launched in northern Iraq in late 2007 and early 
2008 by three-star U.S. Army General Mark Hertling. Hertling was 
trying to combat a network of female suicide bombers. Many of these 
young women were the widows of the male suicide bombers I talked 
about earlier, and they posed a much different and perhaps more 
difficult challenge for the American forces in northern Iraq because 
of the access that women have and the relative scarcity of female 
troops. So here is what happened when Hertling’s troops came upon 
something. 
An unexpected breakthrough in Hertling’s 
effort came when Rania, a fifteen-year old girl, was 
captured in Diyala before her explosive vest could be 
detonated. She told interrogators that she had been 
given juice that made her queasy and dizzy and that 
she was wrapped in the vest before being pushed 
toward a checkpoint. Rania said that her mother was 
an Al Qaeda sympathizer. The debriefing enabled the 
Americans and Iraqis to gain a better understanding 
of how at least some of these women were recruited, 
and her information led to the further capture of six 
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other women in the same cell, all widows of Al Qaeda 
fighters who were primed as suicide bombers. 
American commanders wanted to spread the word 
that Rania and others appeared not to have been 
willing bombers and that the killing of innocent Iraqis 
could not be defended as an approved religious act. 
But that had to be done without American 
fingerprints, which could undermine the message. 
American officers convened sessions with Iraqi 
politicians, human rights activists, and journalists, and 
provided information about the suicide bombers, 
including specific and significant details of Rania’s 
debriefing. They wanted this information to promote 
a public debate, but unlike in the early years of the 
war—when the American military wrote and 
produced information campaigns and even paid off 
local reporters – the content of this discussion was 
left to the Iraqis.  
The Iraqi news media leapt on the story. A 
young female radio host initiated a call-in show 
outside Baqubah, where Rania was captured, and 
called the program ‘Doves of Peace.’ The discussions 
of Rania’s case became the most popular talk show on 
regional radio, and the host became an Iraqi wartime 
Oprah. By the time the 1st Armored Division turned 
over command of northern Iraq to Iraqi forces as part 
of the reduction of American troops across the 
country, instances of female suicide bombers in the 
region had dropped significantly, although the threat 
has not disappeared.6 
So when Thom Shanker and I went to speak with General 
Hertling about this, we said, “you know, General, this seems like a 
perfect example of winning hearts and minds.” Hertling, who has 
been around a long time, said, “Oh, God, guys, don’t use that term, 
please.” In part because of the echoes of Vietnam no doubt. But here 
                                                 
6 SCHMITT & SHANKER at 203-204.  
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is what Hertling had to say that was even more important. He said, 
“What we’re trying to do here is not trying to win hearts and minds 
of these people—that’s kind of a demeaning concept really. What 
we’re trying to do is win their trust and respect. That is the long-term 
goal here and if we can do that, if we can bring people on board 
knowing we have their trust and respect, then we can cement a much 
more enduring relationship in fighting this kind of extremism even 
after we’re gone.”  
So, where are we in this campaign, more than ten years after 
the initial attacks of 9/11? Well, I think there is probably some good 
news and some not so good news. The good news is that of the guys 
who organized the 9/11 campaign, most of them are either dead or 
captured. The number of senior Al Qaeda leaders in the Pakistani 
tribal areas is down to 2 or 3 according to the U.S. intelligence 
community. That is not to say they are not dangerous because they 
are. They are still plotting attacks, they are still trying to get their 
hands on weapons of mass destruction, most likely radiological 
material; and they are still providing some semblance of leadership.  
But with Osama bin Laden’s death, they have been greatly degraded 
in their ability to conceive and execute plots to attack the American 
homeland. 
Here is the not so good news though. In the intervening ten 
years, there have been regional affiliates that have grown up. 
Remember this is Al Qaeda, Inc. Its franchises have grown up, and 
each one of them with a regional flavor and angle. There is one in 
Northern Africa, one in Algeria, one in Mali, one in Mauritania (that 
seems to be cooperating increasingly with yet another organization 
called Boko Haram in Nigeria), and also Al Qaeda in East Africa (the 
remnants of it in Kenya working with al Shabaab in Somalia). Each is 
quite dangerous. In addition, there is a resurgent Al Qaeda in Iraq 
(AQI), which had been pretty much decimated after the surge in Iraq 
in 2007. But with the withdrawal of American forces, the 
organization is making a comeback, not only in Iraq but perhaps 
more threateningly in Syria. There are reports, credible reports, that 
they may be behind some of the major bombings of security targets 
in Damascus. Finally, there is the most vexing of these franchises: the 
one in Yemen formerly called Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula 
(AQAP). This is the organization that was responsible for the so-
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called under pants bomber, the young Nigerian man who tried to 
blow himself up over Detroit on Christmas Day a couple of years 
ago. This is the same group that ten months later packed explosives 
into printer cartridges, and placed them on cargo planes routed 
through Europe and bound for the U.S. Were it not for some timely 
intelligence help from Saudi Arabia, that could have been a 
catastrophic attack as well. So you have these franchises that are 
causing problems. 
Here in the U.S. there is a growing concern about what we 
call homegrown terrorists. They come in two flavors. The first is 
young men, either citizens or residents, who have trained overseas in 
the Pakistani tribal areas or in Yemen. These are people like Faisal 
Shahzad, the young man who tried to blow up an SUV full of 
explosives in Times Square a couple of years ago. This guy seemed to 
have everything going for him: he was a young Pakistani-American, a 
financial analyst for Elizabeth Arden, lived in the suburbs of 
Connecticut, married with two kids. And yet as he returned home 
from his periodic visits to Pakistan and visited his neighbors and 
friends in the tribal areas, he became more and more radicalized, 
more and more incensed about the drone attacks being carried out 
there, and more and more incensed by American support for Israel—
to such an extent that he undertook his bomb attack. 
You also have individuals who in the privacy of their own 
homes watch English language Jihad videos produced by a guy 
named Anwar al-Awlaki. Al-Awlaki, who until he was killed in a 
drone strike in Yemen last year, was probably Al Qaeda’s chief 
propagandist. He spoke perfect English, was American-born, 
preached in mosques in northern Virginia and San Diego, California, 
and yet went over to Yemen to become not only a propagandist but 
also one of the organization’s major operational planners. He worked 
closely with Samir Khan, the editor of an online magazine, who also 
was killed in that drone strike. The franchises have grown and 
become more decentralized. As the main Al Qaeda threat in Pakistan 
has been diminished, the homegrown threat looms. It’s all out there. 
That is why one of the major conclusions that Thom and I 
reach at the end of our book is this: there will be another attack 
against the U.S. We can’t say when or how, but the attack is coming. 
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Up until now, the U.S. has been very good, and pretty lucky.  
Unfortunately, the terrorists only have to be lucky and good every 
once in a while for there to be an attack. 
In one of our last interviews with outgoing Defense Secretary 
Robert Gates, he talked about how terrorist organizations think 
today. They are shifting their focus from the large-scale attacks of the 
9/11 model to throwing pebbles into the spokes of the western 
economy. For example, Al Qaeda has bragged about the fact that the 
printer cartridge plot cost only $4,200 to carry out and yet its impact 
was to shut down international air and cargo travel for several days 
and force the West to spend tens if not hundreds of millions of 
dollars to safeguard the system. Al Qaeda will take that deal any day. 
And they will start to claim credit for the economic downturn that 
the West is facing. So you have some who are still planning for the 
big attack but many more are looking for the disruptive attack. 
The other critique we have in the book is that government 
leaders, starting with the president and all the way down to the 
community level, have not done enough to instill a sense of resilience 
in the American public. By that we do not mean a physical resilience. 
We know that Americans recover from natural disasters. We know, 
after watching a ceremony at Ground Zero last September 11, that 
Americans are very good at building back up what the terrorists tear 
down. What we are talking about instead is psychological resilience. 
The same kind of resilience the Israelis have, that the Brits have, and 
that many other European countries have that have gone through 
their own domestic terrorism in the past. This is a lesson we can 
borrow from these countries. They mourn their dead, clean up the 
debris, and move on. They do not overreact. They do not give the 
terrorists the satisfaction of overreacting, which is in many ways what 
happened in the U.S. after 9/11. 
We did not understand the threat. We did not know what was 
coming next. So we overreacted, both overseas and domestically. It is 
incumbent upon our leaders to tackle this problem. To President 
Obama’s credit, he has tried. He used the R word on the last 
anniversary of 9/11—resiliency. But it is a hard message to hear. 
What he is saying is: suck it up; we’re going to get attacked. It’s too 
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bad if you don’t like it. It is not a very good message to have to 
deliver in a presidential election year. 
And that’s the problem. The political environment is 
currently so polarized, so politically charged that it is hard to have 
this kind of conversation. But having this difficult conversation is the 
only substitute for going through this again. We must have this 
conversation over and over again—at the national level, the state 
level and at the community level—to reinforce the idea that although 
we are under attack, we have learned what the threat is. The threat is 
not ten-feet tall. The threat is not an existential threat, like the Cold 
War, despite the impression left initially by the Bush Administration. 
This is not an enemy that we can wipe off the face of the earth with a 
thermonuclear exchange. We did not understand this in the initial 
days after 9/11. We do now and we have to remember that, and keep 
moving forward. 
